The Eurasian Pole of Inaccessibility is a striking name for an absence. It is the point farthest from a sea or ocean on the planet. Located in China just east of the border with Kazakhstan, the pole gets you a good distance from harbors and coastlines — at least 1,550 miles in any direction — into an expanse of white steppe and blue-beige mountain that is among the least populated places on earth. Here, among some of the last surviving pastoral nomads in Central Asia, nestled between two branches of the Tian Shan range on the edge of Kazakhstan, the largest infrastructure project in the history of the world is growing.
“欧亚大陆难抵极”是个什么都没有的地方的动人名称。它是地球上距离海或大洋最远的地方。这个难抵极位于中国与哈萨克斯坦边境线以东,与港口和海岸线的距离极为遥远,至少是2500公里,这是地球上人口最稀少的地方之一,坐落在广阔无垠的白色干草原和淡蓝色山峦之间。它居于哈萨克斯坦边境天山山脉的两个分支之间,是中亚仅存的一些游牧民族居住的地方,在这里,世界历史上最大的基础设施项目正在拔地而起。
About 80 miles from the Pole of Inaccessibility, just across the border in Kazakhstan, is a village called Khorgos. It has spent most of its existence on the obscure periphery of international affairs, and its official population is just 908. But over the last few years, it has become an important node of the global economy. It is part of an initiative known informally as the new Silk Road, a China-led effort to build a vast cephalopodic network of highways, railroads and overseas shipping routes, supported by hundreds of new plants, pipelines and company towns in dozens of countries. Ultimately, the Belt and Road Initiative, or B.R.I., as the project is more formally known, will link China’s coastal factories and rising consumer class with Central, Southeast and South Asia; with the Gulf States and the Middle East; with Africa; and with Russia and all of Europe, all by way of a lattice of land and sea routes whose collective ambition boggles the mind.
在距离这个难抵极约130公里的地方,边境线的哈萨克斯坦这一边,有一个叫霍尔果斯的村子。在其历史上大部分时间里,这个地方都与国际事务不沾边,村里的正式人口只有908人。但在过去的几年里,它已成为全球经济的一个重要节点,成了非正式名称为“新丝绸之路”倡议的一部分。这个由中国牵头的倡议旨在建设一个四通八达的公路、铁路和海上航运线路的庞大网络,以及在数十个国家建设支持这个网络的数百家新工厂、新管线和供公司员工生活的小镇。最终,这个正式名称为“一带一路”倡议的项目将把中国沿海的工厂和不断壮大的消费阶层,与中亚、东南亚和南亚,与海湾国家和中东,与非洲、以及俄罗斯和整个欧洲连接起来,这一切将由一个纵横交错的陆路和海路网络来实现,项目的总体目标令人难以置信。
Khorgos is a flagship project of this work in progress, an international shipping hub and free-trade zone that its promoters say is poised to become the next Dubai. Thanks to its location at the junction of the world’s soon-to-be-largest national economy and its largest landlocked country, Khorgos has become an unlikely harbinger of the interconnected planet: a zone fully enclosed by the logic of globalization, where goods flow freely across sovereign borders, following corridors designed to locate every human being on the planet within a totalizing network of producers and consumers, buyers and sellers.
霍尔果斯是这个正在进行的工程的旗舰项目,将成为国际航运中心和自由贸易区,项目支持者说它会是下一个迪拜。中国很快将成为世界上最大的国家经济体,而霍尔果斯所在的哈萨克斯坦是世界上最大的内陆国家,由于位居两国边境,它成了相互连接的地球的一个意想不到的预兆:一个完全符合全球化逻辑的地带,在这里,货物跨越主权国家边界,沿着为确定地球上每个人的位置而设计的走廊,在一个生产者和消费者、买家和卖家的网络中自由流动。
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Such victories of the global and industrial over the local, isolated and rural are heralded as the inevitable future — if there is to be a future — of our species. What would that future look like? Whom would it benefit? What would it cost? To find out, last July I caught a sleeper train from Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city, to the Chinese border, where I woke up in a train yard surrounded by desert.
全球化和工业化战胜了本土化、孤立与农村,这些成功被宣称为我们人类不可避免的未来——如果我们有未来的话。这个未来会是什么样子?会对谁有利?会有什么代价?为了寻找答案,去年7月,我从哈萨克斯坦最大的城市阿拉木图坐上一列卧铺火车,来到中国边境。一觉醒来,我已置身那里的火车小站,四周都是沙漠。
Khorgos is one of a cluster of villages encircling a former trading post of the ancient world called Zharkent. From Zharkent, I hoped to arrange a ride to the border. Frescoes of camel caravans flanked the entrance gate on Silk Road Avenue. In a central square stood a rainbow-colored mosque with the sweeping eaves of a Chinese pagoda and an inscription in Uighur enjoining visitors not to forget their past. Next to the mosque was the warren of chopped-up shipping containers that serves as Zharkent’s central market. Taxi drivers hung unhopefully around the watermelon stands.
霍尔果斯是围绕着名叫扎尔肯特的古代世界贸易站的众多村落之一。我从扎尔肯特出发,希望能找人开车把我送到边境。“丝绸之路大道”入门的两侧有骆驼商队的壁画。一个中央广场上矗立着一座色彩斑斓的清真寺,它有中式宝塔的弧形屋檐,上面刻着维吾尔语,告诫来访者不要忘记自己的过去。清真寺旁边是用拆开了的集装箱构成的小通道,这里是扎尔肯特的中心市场。出租车司机不抱希望地坐在西瓜摊旁。
努努尔是一名农夫和出租车司机。他小时候跟着家人从中国新疆逃到了哈萨克斯坦。
努努尔是一名农夫和出租车司机。他小时候跟着家人从中国新疆逃到了哈萨克斯坦。 Andrea Frazzetta/Institute, for The New York Times
Among the drivers was a farmer named Nunur, who had come to Kazakhstan from China in 1962, when he was a young boy and Kazakhstan was a Soviet Socialist Republic. That year, more than 60,000 Chinese Uighurs and Kazakhs escaped to the Soviet Union, crossing with Soviet passports they received from the consulate in Xinjiang and with the apparent cooperation of Chinese border guards. Nunur remembered his parents walking him over red hills at night toward the checkpoint at Khorgos. “They opened the border and let us go into Soviet territory,” he recalled. There were rumors that his relatives who stayed behind were imprisoned or killed. (Nunur, fearing trouble from the authorities, asked that I use only his first name.) His parents, who had raised wheat in China, found work on a collective farm. His mother became a cook while his father learned to drive tractors and Nunur to repair them. He became an expert mechanic. “I’m a master without a diploma,” he said.
司机中有一位名叫努努尔(Nunur)的农民,他1962年从中国来到了哈萨克斯坦,那时他还是个小男孩,哈萨克斯坦还是一个苏维埃社会主义共和国。那年,6万多名中国维吾尔族人和哈萨克族人逃到苏联,他们拿着新疆领事馆发的苏联护照,中国的边防警卫显然没有阻止他们过境。努努尔记得,他的父母带着他在夜里越过红色的山丘,走到了霍尔果斯的检查站。“他们开放了边境,让我们进入了苏联领土,”他回忆道。有传言说,他那些留在中国的亲戚们或被关押、或被杀害。(努努尔怕当局找他的麻烦,要求我不用他的全名。)他的父母曾在中国种小麦,他们在这里的一个集体农场找到了工作。母亲当了厨师,父亲学会了开拖拉机,努努尔则学了拖拉机维修。他成了一名熟练的机械师。“我是个没有文凭的大师,”他说。
I asked Nunur to drive me to a place near the border where we could take in the booming hub of Khorgos at a glance. On the way, we passed his cornfields, apportioned to him after the breakup of the collective farm. Even as Kazakhstan modernized following its 1991 independence, growing rich by regional standards from the sale of oil and outfitting a new capital city with glossy architectural marvels, the eastern border with China remained sparsely developed, its economy dominated by livestock and grain production. Nunur said his village still had no indoor plumbing, and as we left his fields we passed some of the ruins of centralized planning the Soviets left behind: a former winery, a shuttered milk plant.
我请努努尔开车送我到边境附近的一个地方去,在那里我们可以把霍尔果斯这个蓬勃发展的枢纽尽收眼底。路上,我们经过了属于他的玉米地,那是集体农场解体后分给他的。虽然哈萨克斯坦在1991年独立后开始现代化,依靠出售石油,成了按地区标准来看相对富裕的国家,在新首都建起了光彩夺目的建筑奇迹,但该国与中国接壤的东部边境地区仍欠发达,这里的经济以畜牧业和粮食生产为主。努努尔说,他的村子里仍然没有通到室内的自来水,我们从他的玉米地经过时,看到了苏联时代遗留下来的一些中央规划建筑的废墟:一个昔日的葡萄酒厂,一个关了门的牛奶厂。
China’s plans are significantly more ambitious, and they reach far beyond eastern Kazakhstan. The “belt” of the B.R.I. refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt, a tangle of rail and highway routes currently vining their way untidily across the continent from eastern China to Scandinavia. The “road” is the Maritime Silk Road, a shipping lane that will connect Quanzhou to Venice, with prospective stops along the way in Malaysia, Ethiopia and Egypt. To date, at least 68 countries, accounting for nearly two-thirds of the planet’s total population, have signed on to bilateral projects partly funded by China’s policy banks and other state-owned enterprises. Chinese firms are building or investing in new highways and coal-fired power plants in Pakistan, ports in Greece and Sri Lanka, gas and oil pipelines in Central Asia, an industrial city in Oman and a $6 billion railway project in Laos, which in 2017 had a G.D.P. of less than $17 billion. China’s port holdings stretch from Myanmar to Israel and from Mauritius to Belgium. It has spent an estimated $200 billion on B.R.I. projects so far, mostly in Asia, and has implied it will spend a total of $1 trillion on hundreds of projects around the world in the coming years, dwarfing the Marshall Plan by roughly an order of magnitude. When the investments from all the participating countries are combined, the estimated cost rises to $8 trillion.
中国的规划比苏联远大得多,涉及范围远远超出了哈萨克斯坦东部。“一带一路”中的“带”指的是丝绸之路经济带,这个由错综复杂的铁路和公路组成的经济带正在从中国东部穿过欧亚大陆,凌乱地向斯堪的纳维亚半岛延伸。“一带一路”中的“路”指的是海上丝绸之路,它将把泉州和威尼斯连接起来,沿途在马来西亚、埃塞俄比亚和埃及有停靠港口。迄今为止,至少68个国家与中国签定了双边项目协议,涉及的人口占全球总人口近三分之二,这些项目的部分资金来自中国的政策性银行和其他国有企业。中国公司正在建设或投资的项目包括巴基斯坦的新高速公路和燃煤电厂,希腊和斯里兰卡的港口,中亚的天然气和石油管道,阿曼的一座工业城市,以及老挝的一个60亿美元的铁路项目,而老挝2017年的全国生产总值还不到170亿美元。中国拥有位于从缅甸到以色列、从毛里求斯到比利时等国的港口的股份。到目前为止,中国已经在“一带一路”项目上投入了大约2000亿美元,其中大部分在亚洲。中国还暗示,“一带一路”倡议将在未来几年里,在全球数百个项目上投入总计一万亿美元的资金,比马歇尔计划的资金高出约一个数量级,让后者相形见绌。如果把所有参与国的投资加进来,估计总成本将高达8万亿美元。
The B.R.I. is so big and multifarious that describing it can feel like trying to narrate the weather conditions of the entire planet. Some individual components span hundreds of miles and are themselves dauntingly complex and international, like the $68 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or the stalled and scandal-mired Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor. Taken as a whole, the B.R.I. is unfathomable. But I had heard that, at Khorgos, a pioneering outpost, I could get closer than anywhere else to appreciating the scope of its aspirations.
“一带一路”的规模如此之大,项目种类如此之繁多,以至于描述这个计划就好像是试图描述整个地球的天气状况。“一带一路”的个别组成部分本身就跨越数百英里,也极其复杂和国际化,比如680亿美元的中巴经济走廊,或者已陷入停顿且丑闻缠身的孟中印缅经济走廊。从整体上看,“一带一路”让人难以理解。但我听说,霍尔果斯这个开拓性前哨站点,比任何地方都更能让人领会到该项目的雄心壮志。
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Nunur drove me through his village to an overlook within view of a border sentry post, a few miles from the spot where he crossed into Kazakhstan almost six decades before. We parked near a small rock-crushing plant above a valley of bright green cornfields. Beyond the fields, through a blue haze, I could see this improbable new crossroads of the global economy.
努努尔开车带我穿过他的村子,来到了一个可以俯瞰边境哨所的地方,这里距离他在将近60年前进入哈萨克斯坦的地方只有几英里远。我们把车停在一个碎石厂附近,碎石厂下面的山谷里有一片翠绿的玉米田。在田野更远处,透过蓝色的薄雾,我可以看到这个令人难以置信的全球经济新十字路口。
The Chinese side of the border was easiest to spot. Since 2014, an instant city of 100,000 people, also called Khorgos (sometimes spelled Horgos), has appeared; its dark high-rises glittered in the sun. The Kazakh side of the border was less impressive from afar, but I knew it now hosted a first-of-its-kind free-trade zone, opened on territory shared with China. Behind a copse of cypress trees, I could also make out the gantry cranes of the new dry port — an inland shipping-and-logistics hub for freight trains — that began operating in 2015 and could soon be the largest port of its kind in the world. Adjacent to the dry port was a nascent railroad company town, and other plots nearby were cleared for factories and warehouses to be staffed by some of the future residents of the city of 100,000 that, if all goes as planned, will soon rise to match the one across the border.
很容易就看到了边境的中国那边。自2014年开始,那里出现了一座10万人口的速成城市,名字也叫霍尔果斯(英文Khorgos,有时拼写为Horgos),城里黑黝黝的摩天大楼在阳光下闪闪发亮。虽然从远处看,边境的哈萨克斯坦这边不那么壮观,但我知道,这里现在拥有同类自由贸易区中最早的一个,设在跨越两国边界线的领土上。在一片柏树萌生林后面,我还能看出这个新无水港(也就是为货运列车服务的内陆运输物流中心)里龙门吊车的轮廓。这个无水港于2015年开始运行,可能很快会成为全球同类无水港中最大的一个。与无水港毗邻的是一个新建设起来的铁路公司小镇,以及为建设工厂和库房腾出来的其他附近空地,这座10万人口的城市的一些未来居民将在这些工厂和库房工作,如果一切照计划进行,这座小城将很快壮大到边境对面那座城市的规模。
The manager of the plant wandered over. He asked whether we wanted to get through the checkpoint, beyond which was the last village in Kazakhstan and, beyond that, China.
工厂经理向我们慢步走来。他问我们想不想通过检查站,检查站的那边,是哈萨克斯坦的最后一个村子,再往前,就是中国。
We got back in the car and pulled up to two guards who stood at the gate, rifles slung over their shoulders. They looked young and bored. The manager shouted the name of one of them, who walked shyly up to the passenger-side window. It seemed as if everyone in town knew everyone else.
我们回到车里,把车开到检查站前,门口站着两个肩上挎着步枪的卫兵。他们看起来很年轻,一副百无聊赖的样子。经理大喊着其中一人的名字,那个卫兵会意地走到乘客那边的车窗前。似乎这个镇子里每个人都彼此认识。
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“Give me some sunflower seeds,” the manager said. The guard pulled a bag from his pocket and poured seeds into the manager’s cupped hand until it overflowed. The manager explained that we wanted to see China. The guard shrugged and raised the boom gate.
“给我点儿瓜子,”经理说。卫兵从口袋里拿出一个袋子,把瓜子倒在经理合成杯状的双手里,直到瓜子溢出来。经理解释说,我们想去中国看看。卫兵耸了耸肩,升起了门栅。
Two miles beyond the checkpoint, across a valley of farmland, a tangerine ridge signaled the start of China’s largest territory, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. The border was somewhere in the valley beneath us. If we kept going, we would arrive at the Chinese sentry post we could just make out at the top of a train of switchbacks. We didn’t test it, however. In recent years, the Chinese government has erected the most advanced police state in the world in Xinjiang, targeting the region’s Turkic Muslims, especially its Uighur ethnic group, who make up about half the region’s population. As part of what Chinese Communist Party literature describes as “de-extremification” efforts to combat terrorism, authorities have created an exclusion zone of state surveillance, arbitrary mass internment, brainwashing and torture that covers an area more than four times the size of Germany and includes a population almost as big as Australia’s. According to the United States State Department, between 800,000 and two million people, or up to 15 percent of Xinjiang’s Muslim population, have been incarcerated in a growing network of more than 1,000 concentration camps.
检查站再向前两英里,穿过一个满是农田的山谷,一条橘色的山脊标志着中国最大的行政区——新疆维族自治区的开始。边界线在我们脚下山谷的某个位置。如果我们继续前行,就会抵达中国的哨所,我们从这里能依稀看到那个位于一串之字行道路的最高处的哨所。不过,我们没有去试试。近年来,中国政府已经在新疆建起了世界上最先进的警察国家,目标是该地区讲突厥语系语言的穆斯林,尤其是约占自治区人口半数的维吾尔族。作为中国共产党宣传所描述的打击恐怖主义“去极端化”努力的一部分,当局已经创建了一个到处都是政府监控、随意大规模关押、洗脑和折磨人的禁区,这个禁区所覆盖的面积比德国国土的四倍还大,所包括的人数几乎与澳大利亚的人口一样多。根据美国国务院的数据,有高达新疆穆斯林人口的15%的80万到200万人已被关押在1000多个拘留营里,这个拘留营的网络仍在不断扩大。
扎尔肯特的中心市场。用拆开了的集装箱构成的小通道。
扎尔肯特的中心市场。用拆开了的集装箱构成的小通道。 Andrea Frazzetta/Institute, for The New York Times
You couldn’t see any of that from our perch at the border. Everything looked peaceful. To our left, a shepherd’s path ascended into white-capped mountains where herdsmen grazed sheep and cattle in summer, far above the fields of corn and sunflowers. To our right, beyond the ridge, the high-modernist future of international commerce was springing up out of the ground. You could squint and imagine you were looking at a time-lapse photo of the entire history of collective human activity, from the first wandering goat-herder all the way to the present.
从我们在边境的位置上是看不到这些的。一切看起来都平静祥和。在我们左边,是一条牧羊人走的小道,一直通向顶部积着白雪的群山之中。那里是牧人夏天放牧牛羊的地方,海拔远高于玉米地和向日葵地的峡谷。在我们右边,在山脊更远的地方,国际商务的全盛现代主义未来正在拔地而起。你可以眯起眼睛,想象自己是在观看整个人类集体活动历史的一部延时影片,从第一个四处游牧的放羊人一直到现在。
China has never released any official map of Belt and Road routes nor any list of approved projects, and it provides no exact count of participating nations or even guidelines on what it means to be a participant. But this fuzziness may be one of its defining advantages. Rather than a list of megaprojects and bilateral deals, some of which might stumble or fail, the B.R.I. can be understood as a vaguely visible hand guiding all the interlocking developments in infrastructure, energy and trade where China plays any kind of role.
中国从未公布过任何“一带一路”路线的官方地图,也没有公开过任何获准项目的名单,并且从未提供过参与国家的具体数量,甚至更没给出过成为参与国意味着什么的指导方针。但这种模糊性可能正是其决定性优势之一。与其说提供一个大型项目和双边协议(其中一些可能会遇到困难或失败)的清单,不如让人把“一带一路”理解为一只模糊可见的手,这只手在中国能起作用的地方指挥着基础设施、能源和贸易的紧密连接的发展。
It is also a framework through which China’s leaders can present virtually any component of its foreign policy, from a soda-ash plant in Turkey to China’s first foreign military base, in Djibouti, as part of a nonthreatening vision of what party representatives like to call “win win” global development. In recent years, China has floated several expansions of President Xi Jinping’s initial Belt and Road vision that make its scope seem all but limitless: the “Digital Silk Road” into the frontiers of the virtual, the “Pacific Silk Road” to South America, and the Arctic-crossing “Silk Road on Ice.” Xi himself has meanwhile extolled the merits of globalization at Davos and worked to brand his “project of the century” as a natural extension of the spontaneous trade routes that once laced across the Eurasian continent.
“一带一路”也是一个框架。通过这个框架,中国领导人可以把该国外交政策的几乎任何部分,从土耳其的制碱工厂到中国位于吉布提的首个海外军事基地,展现为一个不具威胁性愿景的一部分。中共代表喜欢将这种愿景称为“双赢的”全球发展。近年来,中国已经提出了几种扩大习近平最初的“一带一路”倡议的方案,使得这个倡议的范围几乎无所不包:进入虚拟领域的“数字丝绸之路”;打入南美洲的“太平洋丝绸之路”;以及穿越北极圈的“冰上丝绸之路”。与此同时,习近平自己也在达沃斯赞扬全球化的好处,并且努力将自己的“世纪项目”包装为曾将欧亚大陆联系起来的、自发形成的贸易路线的自然延伸。
Critics have described the B.R.I. as a new kind of colonialism or even part of a strategy of “debt-trap diplomacy,” seducing cash-poor countries with infrastructure projects that are unlikely to generate enough revenue to cover the interest on the loans that funded them. That is the unhappy situation at the China-funded Port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, which the China Harbor Engineering Company took over after Sri Lanka fell behind on debt service. The Center for Global Development lists eight countries that face high risk of “debt distress” from B.R.I. projects that they can’t afford.
批评人士已经将“一带一路”倡议描述为一种新型的殖民主义,甚至称其是“债务陷阱外交”战略的一部分,用基础设施项目诱使缺乏资金的国家,而这些项目不太可能带来足够的收益,让这些国家能够偿还资助项目贷款的利息。这就是斯里兰卡由中国资助建造的汉班托塔(Hambantota)港的不幸局面。在斯里兰卡无法按时偿还债务后,中国港湾工程公司接管了这个港口。全球发展中心(Center for Global Development)表示,有八个国家由于承担不起那些项目,面临着“一带一路”项目带来的“债务压力”的高度风险。
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Kazakhstan is poised to play a literally central role in China’s plan. The B.R.I. was first announced in Astana, at a 2013 ceremony attended by Xi and Kazakhstan’s longtime president, Nursultan A. Nazarbayev. At the same event, Xi and Nazarbayev also celebrated the opening of a joint gas pipeline and signed $30 billion worth of trade and investment agreements. Although in the past Kazakhstan’s economy has tended to orbit Russia’s, in 2007 China edged out Russia as Kazakhstan’s top importer, and some critics fear that the B.R.I. is leading the country deeper into economic vassalage. “Some people think that China is too big,” Nygmet Ibadildin, an assistant professor of international relations at Kimep University, in Almaty, told me. “Kazakh people want a win-win with the B.R.I., but in these situations China wins more often.”
毫不夸张地说,哈萨克斯坦真有可能在中国的计划中起核心作用。“一带一路”倡议最初是在阿斯塔纳宣布的,在2013年的一个有习近平和长时间担任哈萨克斯坦总统的努尔苏丹·A·纳扎尔巴耶夫(Nursultan A. Nazarbayev)出席的典礼上。同一个典礼上,习近平和纳扎尔巴耶夫还庆祝了两国合资修建的天然气管道的开通,并且签署了价值300亿美元的贸易和投资协议。虽然哈萨克斯坦经济过去倾向于围着俄罗斯转,但中国在2007年取代了俄罗斯,成为哈萨克斯坦最大的进口国。一些批评人士担忧,“一带一路”倡议正在将该国带向更深的经济从属地位。“一些人认为中国太大了,”位于阿拉木图的哈萨克斯坦管理经济与战略大学(Kimep University)国际关系助理教授尼格梅特·伊巴迪力丁(Nygmet Ibadildin)对我说。“哈萨克斯坦人想在‘一带一路’倡议中得到双赢,但在这些情况下,中国经常赢得更多。”
努尔肯特的工人的居住地。
努尔肯特的工人的居住地。 Andrea Frazzetta/Institute, for The New York Times
Even in a country with few meaningful democratic rights, there are risks to courting foreign investment. In 2016, a proposed law that would have permitted parcels of farmland to be leased to Chinese companies sparked nationwide protests, leading Nazarbayev to table the measure.
即使是在一个缺少重要民主权利的国家,争取外国投资也存在着风险。2016年,一项将允许把农田分块租给中国公司的提案引发了全国范围的抗议,导致纳扎尔巴耶夫搁置了该措施。
The human rights crisis in Xinjiang has not helped China’s standing in Kazakhstan, either, although the Kazakh government has been careful not to make any public statements that might alienate an important economic partner. While diplomats may be negotiating on behalf of ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang behind closed doors — in January, the Kazakh foreign ministry announced that China would allow 2,000 ethnic Kazakhs to give up their citizenship and cross the border into Kazakhstan — the government is not letting the presence of a prison state across the border interfere with its collaboration with China.
新疆的人权危机也对中国在哈萨克斯坦的名声没有多大帮助,尽管哈萨克斯坦政府一直小心翼翼,避免作出任何可能会疏远一个重要经济伙伴的公开声明。就在外交官们可能正在秘密地为新疆的哈萨克族人进行谈判时——今年1月,哈萨克斯坦外交部宣布,中国将允许2000名哈萨克族人放弃国籍,越过边境进入哈萨克斯坦——政府并没有让边境对面存在的警察国家干扰该国与中国的合作。
That may be largely thanks to the immediate economic concerns of both states, not to mention a shared penchant for autocracy, but it may also owe something to the unprecedented nature of the B.R.I. In many participating countries, the project’s very novelty seems to lend itself to gauzy optimism. In September, the Chinese state-run media group People’s Daily commemorated the fifth anniversary of the B.R.I. with a music video modeled after Coca-Cola’s famous 1971 “I’d Like to Buy the World a Coke” TV spot. The new video featured altered lyrics like “I’d like to build the world a road/And furnish it with love,” sung by smiling representatives of dozens of participant nations, decked out in ruquns,hijabs and dashikis. Rather than defining the initiative in any concrete way, the video slyly co-opts Coke’s ability to serve as empty cipher, meaning anything to anyone. Whatever it is, the B.R.I. is “what the world needs today/It’s the real thing.”
这可能在很大程度上由于两国经济的当务之急,更不用提双方对独裁政体的共同爱好,但这也许也在某种程度上因为“一带一路”倡议史无前例的特点。在许多参与“一带一路”倡议的国家,这个项目的新奇本身似乎给它带上了一层乐观主义的薄纱。去年9月,中国官方媒体《人民日报》用一段音乐视频庆祝了“一带一路”倡议提出五周年,视频模仿了可口可乐1971年做的“我想给这世界买瓶可乐”(I’d Like to Buy the World a Coke)的著名电视广告。这段新音乐视频用的英文歌词有所改动,比如“我想给世界修一条路/用爱铺满它”,演唱者是来自几十个参与国满带笑容的代表,他们用襦裙、盖头和达西基(西非男子穿的花哨而宽松的套衫——译注)等民族服饰盛装打扮。音乐视频没有解释该倡议是什么,而是狡猾地把可口可乐满足需求的能力作为空暗号,让每个人去填自己的意思。不管它是什么东西,“世界需要‘一带一路’/因为它实实在在。”
Khorgos Gateway rises out of the flat desert basin, a pale yellow moon base of cranes and storage silos into which, every so often, a freight train slowly rolls. A trio of rail-mounted gantry cranes loomed 50 feet overhead as I arrived on a damp, overcast morning. Khorgos Gateway may be the most advanced port in Central Asia, but it retains some of eastern Kazakhstan’s rustic atmosphere. When I walked into the lobby of the dry port’s main offices, a security guard was handing out apples he had picked in his garden.
“霍尔果斯东门”(Khorgos Gateway)从平坦的沙漠盆地里拔地而起,像是个配有起重机和储存筒仓的暗黄色的月球基地,一辆货运列车会时不时地慢慢驶入。我在一个潮湿、阴沉的早晨来到这里时,三个安装在铁轨上的龙门吊车架赫然耸立在头顶上方15米处。虽然霍尔果斯东门无水港也许是中亚最先进的港口,但它仍保留着哈萨克斯坦东部的乡村气氛。当我走入无水港的主要办公楼时,一名保安员正在给来人分发他从自家园子里摘来的苹果。
The chief executive of Khorgos Gateway, Zhaslan Khamzin, welcomed me into a tidy office overlooking the freight yard. “The future lies here,” he said proudly. Khorgos was blessed by its position in the middle of Eurasia. “Look at a map, and you’ll see China on one side, Europe on the other, Russia to the north and the Caucasus and Iran to the east. Why am I pointing this out? Precisely because 90 percent of cargo traffic to these countries is currently made by sea.”
霍尔果斯东门无水港的首席执行官查士兰·哈姆津(Zhaslan Khamzin)将我迎入一个井然有序的办公室,办公室窗外就是货运场。“未来就在这里,”他自豪地说。霍尔果斯拥有位于欧亚大陆之间的得天独厚的位置。“看看地图,你会看到这里的一边是中国,另一边是欧洲,俄罗斯在北面,高加索和伊朗在东面。我为什么要指出这些?正是因为运往这些国家的90%货物目前走的是海路。”
国际边境合作中心的旅游景点。这里是中国和哈萨克边境的一个自由贸易区。
国际边境合作中心的旅游景点。这里是中国和哈萨克边境的一个自由贸易区。 Andrea Frazzetta/Institute, for The New York Times
Since the dry port’s inaugural train passed through in 2015, Khamzin said, companies who manufacture goods in China have begun to recognize the advantages of a modernized overland trade route across Asia. The dry port has transferred John Deere combines to Azerbaijan, he claimed, and Hewlett-Packard parts to Western Europe. He added that it may be much cheaper to ship containers by sea, but it can take more than three times as long, and air transit is the most expensive by far. By contrast, a container passing through Khorgos can travel from a Chinese point of origin to Europe in about 14 days, faster than the sea and cheaper than the air. “We’re going to be a central distribution point,” he concluded. If all goes well, according to company forecasts, in a few years Khorgos Gateway will be the largest dry port in the world.
自从这个无水港的首趟列车2015年通行以来,哈姆津说,在中国生产商品的各个公司开始认识到一条穿越亚洲的陆上贸易路线的优势。他声称,无水港已把约翰·迪尔(John Deere)公司的联合收割机运到了阿塞拜疆,还把惠普的零部件运到了西欧。他补充说,虽然海运集装箱也许费用低得多,但花费的时间能是陆运的三倍,而空运的费用则远远高于海运和陆运。作为比较,经过霍尔果斯的集装箱可以在14天内从中国的起始点到达欧洲,比海运快,比空运费用低。“我们将成为一个中央分发点,”他总结道。根据霍尔果斯东门无水港公司的预测,如果一切顺利的话,这里将在几年内将成为全世界最大的无水港。
Out in the shipping yard, wild dogs sniffed at stacked containers. It started to rain. A train had just pulled into port, and workers in yellow slickers were jogging out to meet it. Friendship between nations notwithstanding, Chinese border authorities are tight-lipped about freight schedules. The port sometimes learns about an impending arrival only an hour before it appears on the horizon, whereupon a swift ballet of machine and human movement begins. A siren blared as a gantry crane began to creep toward me through the mist. The three 41-ton cranes straddled six rail lines — three are the wide-gauge rails that stretch across the post-Soviet world from Helsinki to Ulaanbaatar; three are the standard gauge used in both China and Europe — and from my perspective they appeared to tower impossibly over the mountains around us. From a dangling control booth, a crane operator lowered containers onto their beds with dull-eyed expertise.
在外面的货运场上,野狗对排放整齐的集装箱嗅来嗅去。外面开始下雨。一列火车刚刚驶入港口,身穿黄色防雨衣的工人们跑着出来迎接它。虽然两国交情不错,但中国的边境当局对货运时间表守口如瓶。港口有时候只是在一个即将到来的货运列车在视野中出现的一小时前才知道有车要来,随后,一场机器和人员行动的快速芭蕾便开始了。随着一个龙门吊车穿过薄雾向我所在的方向慢慢移动,汽笛鸣响起来。这三个40公吨重的吊车横跨在六条铁道之上——其中三条是从赫尔辛基延伸至乌兰巴托的跨越后苏联世界的宽轨铁道;还有三条是中国和欧洲都使用的标准轨距铁道——从我的视角,它们看上去不可思议地比我们周围的大山还高。从一个悬在空中的控制室里,一名吊车操作员用令人麻木地熟练度把集装箱吊起,然后慢慢放到列车平板上。
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The national railway company of Kazakhstan owns 51 percent of Khorgos Gateway. The remaining 49 percent is split between two Chinese state-owned companies. Khamzin viewed China’s participation not as economic imperialism but as proof of the port’s likelihood of success. The Chinese, he explained, “are the kind of people that if they saw no commercial opportunity, they wouldn’t invest here.”
哈萨克斯坦的国有铁路公司拥有霍尔果斯无水港51%的股份。其余49%的股份由两家中国国企分别持有。哈姆津不把中国的参与看作是经济帝国主义,而是港口成功可能性的证明。他解释说,中国人“是不看到商业机遇,就不会在这里投资的那种人”。
Such arrangements are less one-sided in Kazakhstan than in some of the more debt-strapped B.R.I. countries, so it’s very unlikely that what happened in Sri Lanka will happen here. But Chinese investments have in all likelihood muffled Kazakhstan’s response to the crackdown in Xinjiang.
这种安排在哈萨克斯坦不那么一边倒,不像在陷入“一带一路”债务更深的国家那样,所以斯里兰卡的情况不太可能会在这里发生。但中国的投资已经十有八九降低了哈萨克斯坦对新疆发生的镇压的回应。
Each train that arrives at Khorgos has to pass through the Chinese region, which is home to 24 million people, including more than 12 million Uighurs and about 1.5 million Kazakhs. Although political unrest has troubled the region for decades, including, in recent years, a spate of knife attacks and bombings by Uighur separatists, authorities in Xinjiang have responded with brutal asymmetry, rounding up hundreds of thousands of Uighurs alongside thousands of ethnic Kazakh and Kyrgyz residents in a sweeping internment drive the scope of which rivals Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Their “offenses” range from open displays of religious belief — wearing a beard, praying in public, owning a Quran or refusing to smoke or eat pork — to simply traveling with or even speaking to relatives abroad. For those not yet detained, Xinjiang has become a dystopian zone of extralegal checkpoints, patrols, GPS tracking and random home inspections.
每列抵达霍尔果斯的火车都需要经过中国的这个自治区,有2400万人居住在那里,其中包括超过1200万维吾尔族人及约150万哈萨克族人。尽管政治动荡困扰这个地区已经几十年了,包括近年来发生的一系列维吾尔分裂分子制造的持刀伤人和炸弹袭击事件,但新疆当局所做的回应的残忍程度极不对等,当局将以数十万计的维吾尔族人、还有数千名哈萨克族人和柯尔克孜族居民抓了起来,这项行动把这么多的人关进了集中营,其范围之广堪比毛泽东的文化大革命。这些人的“罪行”无所不包,从公开展示宗教信仰——蓄胡、在公众场合祈祷、拥有《古兰经》或拒绝吸烟或吃猪肉——到仅仅是与居住在国外的亲人一起旅行,就连跟国外亲人通话也是罪行。对那些尚未遭到拘留的人来说,新疆已成为一个到处都是法外检查站、巡逻人员、GPS追踪,以及随意入室检查的反乌托邦地带。
一名哈萨克男子将货物运出ICBC。当地的“运送者”定期帮助购物者规避海关对购买的限制。
一名哈萨克男子将货物运出ICBC。当地的“运送者”定期帮助购物者规避海关对购买的限制。 Andrea Frazzetta/Institute, for The New York Times
Some experts say the camps and other security measures are partly in reaction to the increased freight traffic across Xinjiang, much of which now comes through Khorgos Gateway. “The role of Xinjiang has changed greatly with the B.R.I.,” Adrian Zenz, an academic expert on China’s minority policy, told me. China’s B.R.I. ambitions have transformed Xinjiang from a fringe territory into what party leaders call a “core region” of development. That’s why awareness of the camps among people in places like Kazakhstan was such an issue, Zenz said. “It has significant potential to cast a very negative light on the Belt and Road.”
一些专家说,这些拘押营及其他安全措施,部分是针对穿越新疆的货运量越来越多作出的反应,这些货运量中的很大部分都经过霍尔果斯无水港。“新疆所起的作用随着‘一带一路’倡议发生了巨大变化,”研究中国少数民族政策的学者郑国恩(Adrian Zenz)对我说。中国“一带一路”倡议的雄心已经把新疆从一个边缘地区转化成了中共领导人口中的发展“核心区”。这就是为什么在哈萨克斯坦这样的地方,人们知道那些拘留营的存在很重要,郑国恩说。“这种意识有相当大的可能会给‘一带一路’倡议蒙上极为负面的色彩。”
After my tour of the dry port, I headed a mile down the road to Nurkent, a newly built town of low bungalows and apartment blocks. For all its symbolic importance, Khorgos Gateway is still a modest operation; if it were a United States seaport, its 2018 throughput would place it somewhere around the 26th-largest in the country, beneath the ports of Mobile, Ala.; Boston; and Gulfport, Miss. There are just 190 employees, which Khamzin said was close to capacity, and most of them live in Nurkent, alongside railroad workers, police officers, border guards, customs officials and other agents of the new frontier. Except for the cawing of crows nesting within an apartment building’s crumbling gables, the town was silent. During a visit to the region in 2016, Nazarbayev predicted the population would grow and merge with Zharkent to form a large city, but this was hard to visualize. The site of a planned expansion was marked by a roundabout with a tiered silver gateway — the “2001” obelisk as imagined by Frank Gehry — through whose arch I could see only an untended field of scrubland.
在无水港转了一圈后,我沿路向一英里外的努尔肯特前行,这是一座新建的小城,城里有低矮的平房和公寓楼。尽管霍尔果斯无水港有着重大的象征意义,但其运作规模仍然不大;如果它是一个美国海港的话,其2018年的吞吐量会让它在美国港口排名上名列第26左右,位于阿拉巴马州的莫比尔港、波士顿港和密西西比州格尔夫波特港之后。霍尔果斯无水港只有190名员工,哈姆津说这个人数与港口所需的相近,这些人中大部分都住在努尔肯特,住在那里的还有铁路工人、警察、边境卫兵、海关官员,以及这条新前线上的其他从业人员。除了在一栋公寓楼人字形屋顶下用剥落的砖块筑巢的乌鸦发出的叫声外,这里一片寂静。在2016年对该地区的一次访问中,纳扎尔巴耶夫曾预言,当地人口将出现增长,并将与扎尔肯特合并,形成一座大城市,但这还很难想象。计划用于扩张的地方现在的标志是一个交通环岛,岛上有一个银色的阶梯式门——那是由弗兰克·盖里(Frank Gehry)设想出来的“2001”方尖碑——通过起拱门,我看到的只是一片无人看管的低矮灌木丛林地。
As I stood looking at the archway, a car pulled up. A man in straw hat and sandals hoisted himself out of the passenger side. “I guard this place,” he said. He uncoiled a hose on the ground and began watering the grass around the gate. “This is the double door to the future of Nurkent, where the city will rise up.”
就在我站在那里看拱门的时候,一辆车在我旁边停下。一名头戴草帽、脚穿凉鞋的男子从乘客那边的车门下来。“这里由我看守,”他说。他拉开盘在地上的软管,开始给环绕拱门的草坪浇水。“这是通往努尔肯特未来的双大门,城市会在那里拔地而起。”
Khorgos’s other major landmark is a boomtown of open borders known as the International Center for Boundary Cooperation, or I.C.B.C., which China and Kazakhstan established in 2011 about six miles from the dry port. Here it is not only the goods that move freely back and forth but also the people. In this duty- and visa-free zone, Kazakh citizens willing to brave the hourlong wait at customs control are permitted to enter a walled section of the Chinese side of Khorgos across the border to buy cheap linens and electronics, and Chinese tourists may enter a walled leisure area inside Kazakhstan to buy souvenirs and eat Kazakh delicacies like shashlik and laghman.
霍尔果斯另一个重要地标是一座因开放边境而出现的、名为国际边境合作中心(International Center for Boundary Cooperation,简称ICBC)的新城。中国和哈萨克斯坦于2011年在距离无水港约10公里处设立了这个中心。在这里,来去自由的不只有货物,还有人。在这个免税、免签证的区域,愿意在海关排队等待一小时的哈萨克公民可获准进入边境那边中国的霍尔果斯的一个用高墙围起来的区域,他们可以在那里购买便宜的针织品和电器,而中国游客则可以进入哈萨克斯坦这边的一片用高墙围起来的悠闲娱乐区,购买纪念品,享用烤羊肉串和胡萝卜面等哈萨克佳肴。
A United Nations human rights panel describes the entirety of Xinjiang as a “massive internment camp,” but that didn’t stop workers I met at the dry port from suggesting I cross into China by way of the I.C.B.C. Khorgos Gateway and the I.C.B.C. are the products of special economic development zones set up in coordination with China: industrial and commercial arenas designed to foster jobs and investments. There are dozens of such zones within China — the first, Shenzhen, is now a megacity of more than 12 million people — but Khorgos is the first to exist partly outside China’s own borders. That will soon change. Chinese officials have announced plans to build 50 more international zones in countries from Algeria to Vietnam.
一个联合国人权小组将整个新疆描述为一个“大规模拘留营”,但这并没有阻止我在这里遇到的工人建议我通过霍尔果斯无水港ICBC进入中国。这个ICBC是与中国一起设立的特别经济发展区的产物,也就是为促进就业和投资而设立的工业和商业区。中国国内有几十个这种经济特区——第一个特区深圳如今已是拥有超过1200万人口的大城市——但霍尔果斯是第一个部分存在于中国边境之外的经济特区。中国官员已经宣布了要在从阿尔及利亚到越南等国家设立50多个国际经济特区的计划。
在哈萨克斯坦阿拉木图和东边的终点站阿腾科里站之间行驶的列车。
在哈萨克斯坦阿拉木图和东边的终点站阿腾科里站之间行驶的列车。 Andrea Frazzetta
At Khorgos, the I.C.B.C. seems intended to complement the dry port’s vision of frictionless trade with an equivalent vision of borderless commerce, even if most Kazakhs understand the project as a wholesale depot for cheaply made Chinese goods. A popular hustle among shopkeepers from Almaty is to hire one of the locals who wait outside the I.C.B.C., and who are euphemistically called “carriers,” to help circumvent the weight limits on imports. By all accounts, customs officials tend to look the other way.
在霍尔果斯,ICBC的目的似乎是让无水港畅通无阻的贸易愿景、以及一个相同的无边界商贸愿景变得更完美,即使大多数哈萨克人对这个项目的理解是,它是造价便宜的中国商品批发仓。阿拉木图商店店主中流行的一种做法是,雇一名当地人等在ICBC外边,帮忙规避针对进口商品的重量限制,这些人被委婉地称作“运送者”。据说,海关官员对这种情况会睁一眼闭一眼。
My state-assigned guide picked me up at my hotel in Zharkent in a sleek Mercedes sedan that he drove as if we had just robbed a bank. “Are you nervous?” he asked, laughing, as we careered around a watermelon truck. His name was Marat Abaiuly. If the I.C.B.C. was the most important of China’s outposts in Kazakhstan, Abaiuly was its ambassador, the handsome liaison to opinion makers and potential investors. He made his power known by blowing through checkpoints with a friendly honk or, if necessary, by leaping out of the car to grip the soldier on duty by the forearm.
我那个由国家指派的导游到我住的扎尔肯特酒店来接我,他开着一辆时髦的梅萨德斯轿车,开车的方式就好像我们刚抢了一家银行似的。就在我们猛地绕开一辆运送西瓜的卡车时,他大笑着问我,“你紧张吗?”他叫马拉特·阿拜尤里(Marat Abaiuly)。如果说ICBC是中国在哈萨克斯坦最重要的贸易前哨,阿拜尤里就是驻这里的大使,是舆论制造者和潜在投资者的英俊联络人。他用在一路上通过检查站时友善地按喇叭,或者如果有必要的话,跳出车门抓住当值士兵的前臂,来让人知道他所拥有的这种权力。
It was 10 in the morning, and a line of wholesalers and hopeful carriers had formed beyond a fence topped with concertina wire. Bus drivers reclined inside their open cargo holds, chain-smoking and preparing to nap through the day. Inside the customs-control building, a construction worker was destroying the tile floor with a jackhammer. Improvised lines formed around the rubble.
当时是上午10点,批发商和满怀希望的运送者们在上边带有铁丝网的栅栏外排起了长队。大巴司机们躺在他们敞开着的货舱里面,不停地抽烟,为打盹度过这一天做准备。在海关大楼内,一个建筑工人正在用手提钻捣毁地瓷砖。破碎瓷砖的周围有临时画出的线。
China is said to be spending billions of dollars building up its side of Khorgos. By contrast, Kazakhstan’s share of the I.C.B.C. is mostly a dream of the future. Projects like a constellation of luxury hotels, a sports complex and a Disneyland-style theme park called Happy Land Khorgos have languished for lack of funding. Fields of rubble and stalled construction projects are scattered among the few small retail buildings and the yurt-shaped gift shops that are the Kazakh side’s most distinctive feature.
中国据说正在投资数十亿美元把自己这边的霍尔果斯建设起来。相比之下,哈萨克斯坦这边的ICBC大部分还只是未来的一个梦想。一批奢华酒店、综合体育场,以及一个名为“霍尔果斯快乐天地”(Happy Land Khorgos)的迪士尼式主题公园等项目,由于资金不足处于停工状态。散布在为数不多的小型零售大楼之间的是成片的瓦砾和停工的在建项目,再就是是哈萨克斯坦这边最有特色的东西,外形像蒙古包帐篷的礼品店了。
In recent years, the name Khorgos has instead become synonymous among Kazakhs with smuggling rings and high-profile corruption cases. In 2011, authorities arrested the head of customs at Khorgos as part of a larger takedown of a $130 billion smuggling ring. In 2016, the former head of the I.C.B.C. was caught on tape accepting a $1 million bribe for a construction bid. Locals do not tend to figure in these public scandals, but based on the crowds I saw in front of the border checkpoint, informal gray-market carrying at Khorgos seems to have replaced animal husbandry as the region’s main line of work. “Most locals work at the I.C.B.C. carrying cargo,” the chief executive of an Almaty-based truck transport company later told me, describing the work as a kind of pseudolegal smuggling. “That’s how they make money.”
近年来,霍尔果斯这个名字已经在哈萨克人那里成为了走私团伙和广受关注的腐败案的代名词。2011年,当局逮捕了霍尔果斯海关负责人,那是抓获一个更大、涉及1300亿美元的走私集团行动的一部分。2016年,ICBC前负责人因一个建筑投标受贿100万美元的过程被人录了音。这些公众丑闻中的主角一般不是当地人,但从我在边境检查站前看到的那群人来看,在霍尔果斯从事非正式的灰色运送工作,似乎已经取代了畜牧,成为当地的主要工种。“大多数当地人都在ICBC干运送的活儿,”一名总部位于阿拉木图的卡车运输公司首席执行官后来告诉我,他把这种工作描述为某种伪合法的走私。“那是他们赚钱的方式。”
霍尔果斯山上的哈萨克斯坦人准备打中亚叼羊。这是他们的国家运动,运动员们骑在马上,对一头无头羊尸争夺不休。
霍尔果斯山上的哈萨克斯坦人准备打中亚叼羊。这是他们的国家运动,运动员们骑在马上,对一头无头羊尸争夺不休。 Andrea Frazzetta/Institute, for The New York Times
Abaiuly arranged for an I.C.B.C. van to drive us across the open border into China, where the main attractions for visiting Kazakhs are four large, windowless malls. The malls are honeycombed with shops where women of all ages and a few older men sell underwear, electronics and an array of other inexpensive products under fluorescent lights. One mall was dedicated entirely to fur coats, a gift of ritual significance in Kazakhstan, particularly between in-laws at weddings. It was early, and there were no customers anywhere. Floor after floor of identical shops stood empty, their racks of odorless pelts doubled and tripled by wall-length mirrors.
阿拜尤里安排了一辆ICBC厢式货车把我们送过与中国接壤的开放边境,那里对来访的哈萨克斯坦人有主要吸引力的是四个没有窗户的大型购物中心。这些购物中心里满是店铺,各个年龄段的女性和少数上了年纪的男性在日光灯下售卖内衣、电器和一系列其他平价商品。一个购物中心只卖皮毛大衣,这是在哈萨克斯坦具有礼节性意义的东西,尤其是在婚礼上的姻亲之间。当时天色还早,却已经看不到顾客了。各层楼上一模一样的店铺空无一人,货架上摆着没有气味的动物皮,和墙一样高的镜子让货物看起来比实际的多两到三倍。
Some workers I met were Chinese citizens from Xinjiang. I had heard that, in some towns, even talking to a journalist is considered grounds for detention, so I didn’t say much, and I was relieved to come across an outspoken furrier from Kazakhstan, Zhannur Erkenkyzy, who had worked at the border for six months. She got the job because she could speak Chinese, Russian, Uighur and Kazakh. She was also the store’s model, she said, and she showed me her Instagram page, on which she appeared nestled inside the furs of minks, foxes and beavers, although at the moment she was wearing no fur at all, just a black cocktail dress that reflected no light.
我在那里遇到的一些员工是来自新疆的中国公民。我听说过,在一些城镇,仅仅是和记者讲话都会被作为拘留的理由,所以我没怎么说话,当我遇到一名坦率的哈萨克斯坦毛皮商占木尔·埃尔肯兹(Zhannur Erkenkyzy)时,我感到如释重负。她已经在边境工作了六个月。她之所以能获得了这份工作,是因为会说汉语、俄罗斯语、维吾尔语和哈萨克语。她也是这家店的模特,她说,还给我看了她的Instagram页面,上面有她依偎着貂皮、狐狸皮和海狸皮的照片,不过,此时此刻她一点也没穿皮毛制品,只穿着一件黑色的鸡尾酒礼服套裙,一点光都不反。
Erkenkyzy said she worked seven days a week unless she happened to ask for a day off. The time involved in crossing the unpredictable border meant that the job occupied most of her waking life, of which one highlight was catching thieves. “When we see a shoplifter, we put on red armbands and beat them with sticks,” she said excitedly. Abaiuly interrupted, whispering in low, snappy Russian: “Why are you saying such nasty stuff about us to the reporter?”
埃尔肯兹说她一周工作七天,除非她提出要休息一天的话。等待通过难以预测的边境要花的时间意味着,这份工作占据了她大部分醒着的时间,工作中的一个亮点是抓贼。“当我们看到店里有小偷时,会戴上红袖标,用棍子打他们,”她兴奋地说。这时,阿拜尤里插了进来,没好气地小声用俄语说,“你为什么要对记者讲关于我们的这么糟糕的事情?”
Back on the Kazakh side, we wandered the yurts, which were staffed by Chinese clerks who spoke no Russian or Kazakh. Tourists were milling about inside one of them, browsing rows of instant coffee, jade eggs and taxidermic hawks and antelopes. Outside, a row of golf carts and one stretch limousine waited to take the tourists back. I watched a group of women in ankle-length skirts cross a moonscape of rocks, heading toward China and dragging wheeled luggage behind them. When I asked Abaiuly about the prevalence of the carriers, he smiled. “On that subject I cannot speak,” he said.
回到哈萨克斯坦这边,我们在蒙古包外形的店里逛了逛。店里的员工都是中国人,既不会俄语,也不会哈萨克语。游客们在其中一个店里漫无目的的闲逛,浏览着成排的速溶咖啡、翡翠蛋,以及老鹰、羚羊等动物标本。店外面是一排高尔夫球车和一台加长豪华礼车,等待着将游客们送回去。我看着一群穿着及踝长裙的女子,穿过像是月球表面的石头地带,向中国方向走去,身后还拖着轮子拉杆箱。当我向阿拜尤里问起那些无处不在的运送者时,他笑了。“我对这个话题不能发言,”他说。
At an outdoor restaurant, I met a shashlik cook who lived inside one of the yurts where Chinese tourists ate. He left and re-entered the I.C.B.C. once a week to stay out of legal trouble, and said it was cheaper than living anywhere else.
在一个户外餐馆,我遇到了一个烤羊肉串的大师傅,他就住在中国游客用餐的一个蒙古包里面。他每周离开、再重新进入ICBC一次,以避免法律上的麻烦,他说住在这里比住在其他地方都要便宜。
哈萨克斯坦毛皮商和模特占木尔·埃尔肯兹在中国侧的ICBC工作。
哈萨克斯坦毛皮商和模特占木尔·埃尔肯兹在中国侧的ICBC工作。 Andrea Frazzetta/Institute, for The New York Times
One way to read the history of Central Asia is as a record of interactions between the mounted nomads who were long the primary occupants of the Eurasian Steppe and the sedentary populations who lived among them. As late as the 1930s, the dominant activity on the steppe was pastoral: herding sheep, goats and other livestock. Herders roamed in large, shifting clans on either side of the Tian Shan and Altai ranges, traveling on horseback and occasionally fragmenting or forming political alliances. These nomadic hordes proved unconquerable until the late 18th century, when they began to fall to Chinese conquest and, in what is now Kazakhstan, to Russian — later Soviet — rule.
对中亚历史的一种阅读,是将其视为骑马的游牧民族与在他们之中定居的人口的互动记录。长期以来,骑马的游牧民族一直是这个欧亚大草原上的主要居住者。直至1930年代,大草原上的活动仍以畜牧为主:放绵羊、山羊和其他牲畜。在天山和阿尔泰山两侧,大群的牧人骑着马四处游荡,结成不断变化的部族,有时分裂,有时形成政治联盟。事实证明,这些游牧部落坚不可摧,直到18世纪晚期,他们在那时开始被中国人征服,在如今的哈萨克斯坦,他们被俄罗斯、后来是苏联统治。
In 1929, the leaders of the Soviet Union determined that Kazakhstan’s pastoral work force would go to work on farms. This forced collectivization was framed as a civilizing mission to modernize a population whom many Russians had long viewed as primitive barbarians. Land formerly devoted to grazing was irrigated and turned over to wheat production, with the immediate result that around 90 percent of the country’s livestock died. The subsequent famine caused the deaths of one-quarter of the population of Kazakhstan and anywhere from one-quarter to one-half of all ethnic Kazakhs, a human-made catastrophe that ended nomadism as it had been practiced in the region for thousands of years. Kazakhs became a minority in the nation the Soviets had founded in their name.
1929年,苏联领导人作出决定,让哈萨克斯坦的畜牧业劳动力去农场工作。这种强行的集体化做法被套在了教化使命的框架之中,为的是让被许多俄国人长期视为原始野蛮的人口现代化。原来用于放牧的土地经过灌溉,改为生产小麦,这样做的直接后果是该国约90%的牲畜死掉了。随之而来的大饥荒导致哈萨克斯坦人口的四分之一、以及哈萨克族全部人口的四分之一到二分之一死亡,这个人造的灾难结束了该地区传承了数千年的游牧生活。哈萨克人成了苏联以他们的名义成立的共和国的少数民族。
Nomadic pastoralism remains central to Kazakh mythology — Nazarbayev describes himself as “the son, grandson and great-grandson of herders” — but as a practice it has retreated to the periphery of the country’s economy. Most of the surviving herders in this part of Kazakhstan practice a form of seminomadism known as transhumance, alternating between winters in a low-altitude village and summers in a pasture, or zhailau, in the mountains. I wondered how those in the mountains above Khorgos were reacting to the economic foment that had emerged around their winter homes. One morning I visited a village of herders in the Zhongar Alatau, a northern stretch of the Tian Shan named for the last nomadic khanate to rule over the steppes of western China.
游牧的畜牧生活在哈萨克神话中仍占有中心地位——纳扎尔巴耶夫将自己描述为“牧人的儿子、牧人的孙子,以及牧人的曾孙”,但作为一种生活方式,游牧已经退到了该国经济的边缘。在哈萨克斯坦这个地区,大多数遗留下来的牧人以一种半游牧的方式生活,所谓的“季节性迁移放牧”,他们在冬季住在低海拔的村庄里,夏季到山里的牧场去放牧。我想知道那些在俯瞰霍尔果斯的山里放牧的人们,对他们冬季家园附近出现的经济热潮有什么反应?一个早晨,我探访了中噶尔山里的一个牧人小村,这是天山向北边延伸的一段,是以最后一名统治中国西部草原的游牧可汗的名字命名的。
It was Friday, and most of the men were at the village mosque. I asked the local damkeeper’s son, who said his name was Turar, to take me farther into the mountains where families graze their herds throughout the summer. I got into Turar’s old Lada four-wheel drive, and we rattled and bounced up the edge of a steep bank that commanded a wide prospect of sand dunes and crumpled foothills. Hawks gyred overhead. I thought to myself that the beauty of Kazakhstan defied description, but Turar, who had lived here all his life, managed to capture its pristine emptiness. “It’s like a screen,” he said cryptically. Then, to clarify: “Like a computer. Like the Windows screen.”
那天是周五。村子里的大多数男性都去了清真寺。我让当地水坝看守者的儿子带我进到更深的山里,那里是这些家庭整个夏天放牧的地方。水坝看守者的儿子说他叫图拉尔(Turar)。我坐进了图拉尔老旧的四轮驱动拉达汽车,然后一路嘎吱作响、上下颠簸地沿着陡峭的河岸往山里开,从河岸可以看到沙丘和连绵起伏的丘陵。雄鹰在我们头顶上盘旋。我暗自想着哈萨克斯坦的美景无法用言语来形容,但在这里生活了一辈子的图拉尔却能捕捉到这里尚未开发的空无一切之感。“就像是一个屏幕,”他隐晦地说。然后,为了进一步说明:“就像是一台计算机。像Windows系统的屏幕一样。”
To reach the zhailau, we left Turar’s car at the dam where his family controls the flow of snowmelt and mountain spring through a Soviet-era irrigation canal. Before long, we arrived at an emerald slope where a single yurt sat embosomed in alpine lushness. Turar said this area was called the Black Gorge.
为了到达草原,我们在大坝下了图拉尔的车,他的家人在那里控制着进入一个苏联时代修建的灌溉渠的融化雪水和山泉的流量。没过多久,我们抵达了一片翠绿的山坡,在高山繁茂的青草怀抱之中只有一个蒙古包。图拉尔说,这个地区名叫“黑峡谷”(Black Gorge)。
表兄弟阿尔森·阿克哈特和特米尔兰·喀米尔在哈萨克斯坦。
表兄弟阿尔森·阿克哈特和特米尔兰·喀米尔在哈萨克斯坦。 Andrea Frazzetta/Institute, for The New York Times
A friend of Turar’s emerged from the yurt, blinking at the sun. His name was Arsen Akhatay, and he’d been napping. Every spring, he helped drive the family livestock, a few hundred sheep and 50 cows and horses, up to the zhailau and tended them. He returned to the village when school started in the fall, leaving his parents to drive the animals back down. In between, there was a lot of free time. Sometimes he passed it playing kokpar, a popular Central Asian sport in which players fight over a headless goat carcass while on horseback. Akhatay was the attacker on his local team and was meant to be at training camp this week for nationals, but he’d fallen sick instead. He surveyed his sheep without enthusiasm. Each was labeled in resin with a large “5” marking it as a member of his family’s flock. A solar panel staked into the ground near the doorway to the yurt powered a Chinese-made radio and a four-inch TV set. Turar gestured farther into the gorge, where Akhatay’s family pastured their horses a mile or so in, and said that if you kept on in that direction, you’d hit China.
图拉尔的一个朋友从帐篷里走了出来,阳光晃得他直眨眼。他叫阿尔森·阿克哈特(Arsen Akhatay),之前一直在睡午觉。每个春天,他会帮着把家里的牲畜(几百只羊、50头牛和马)赶到山上的草原里,看管它们。当学校秋季开学时,他会返回村子,将把牲畜赶下山的工作留给他的父母。在放牧期间,他有很多空闲时间。有时候他会参加打中亚叼羊(kokpar)的游戏,这是一种流行的中亚运动,运动员们骑在马上,对一头无头羊尸争夺不休。阿克哈特是本地运动队里的进攻者,本周本来应该到训练营去为全国大赛做准备,但他却生病了。他漠然地审视着自己的羊群。每只羊身上都用树脂涂着大大的数字“5”,这个标记意味着是他家羊群的成员。蒙古包门口附近一个固定在插在地里的桩子上的太阳能板,为中国产的一台收音机和一台四英寸的电视提供能源。图拉尔向峡谷远处示意,阿克哈特家在再走一英里左右的地方放牧他们的马,图拉尔说,如果你一直往那个方向走,就能到中国。
Akhatay was wearing a blue camouflage jacket, the kind worn by Kazakh police officers on field exercises. His cousin came out of the yurt wearing the same thing. During the school year they lived in a village near Zharkent called Turpan. Akhatay, who was about to start his senior year of high school, said he did not intend to look after sheep his whole life. I asked whether he wanted a job at Khorgos.
阿克哈特穿着一件蓝色迷彩外套,哈萨克警察在野外演练时穿的那种。他的表兄弟从蒙古包里出来,穿着同样的衣服。上学期间,他们住在扎尔肯特附近一个叫吐鲁番的村子里。再开学,阿克哈特就该读高中的最后一年了,他说自己不想当一辈子羊倌。我问他是否想在霍尔果斯找份工作。
“Many people from the village work at the border as carriers,” he said. “There are many official jobs but also many unofficial.” All things being equal, he said, he wanted an official one. When he graduated, he planned to enroll at the military institute in Almaty to become a border guard.
“村子里好多人都在边境当运送者,”他说。“有许多正式的工作,但也有许多非正式的。”如果一切不变的话,他说,他想找份正式的工作。他高中毕业后的打算是,去阿拉木图的军事院校学习,以后当一名边境卫兵。
On our drive down the mountain there was nothing to displease the eye, and before long we arrived at yet another small mountain village of white birches and potato gardens. Turar parked the car by a water pump and introduced me to a former classmate, a Kazakh named Zholaman Tashimkhan, who had come out to greet us.
在我们开车下山的路上,一切都美不胜收。没过多久,我们抵达了另一个小山村,里面有白桦树和土豆园。图拉尔在一个水泵旁停好车,把我介绍给他一位曾经的同学,一位名为佐拉曼·塔什米汗(Zholaman Tashimkhan)的哈萨克人,他走出来向我们打招呼。
We sat on the curb near the pump. Like Arsen, Tashimkhan spent most of the summer up in the mountains, but he was older and had already been drawn to the jobs at the border. He worked for a year for the railroad, a good job that is hard to come by through normal channels — “I used my connections,” he said, and laughed — but then his sister’s husband found him work as a carrier. “It’s not an official job,” he said. “Not a public job.”
我们坐在水泵附近的路边。像阿克哈特一样,塔什米汗夏天大部分时候都在山上度过,但他年龄要大一些,已经被边境工作吸引过去了。他在铁路上干了一年活,这是很难通过正常渠道获得的一份好工作——“我利用了我的关系,”他说,然后大笑起来——但之后,他姐夫给他找了一份做运送者的工作。“这不是份正式工作,”他说。“不是给公家干活。”
对塞拉古·萨于特贝(玻璃后者)的审判。她是一名出生在中国的哈萨克女子,在逃离新疆后要求在哈萨克斯坦获得政治庇护。
对塞拉古·萨于特贝(玻璃后者)的审判。她是一名出生在中国的哈萨克女子,在逃离新疆后要求在哈萨克斯坦获得政治庇护。 Andrea Frazzetta/Institute, for The New York Times
A few men from the village began to gather around the pump as we talked. Tashimkhan explained that he had worked for a wholesaler based in Zharkent, crossing into the I.C.B.C. four or five days a week to bring household products, mostly bedsheets and linens, back into Kazakhstan. He was paid according to how much he managed to get through customs. On an average day, he might earn $15 or $20 — good money — and occasionally as much as $60. Customs enforcement was lax. “For us, you talk to the official working there, and you just bring things out,” he said.
在我们聊天的时候,几个来自村子里的男子开始聚集到水泵周围。塔什米汗解释说,他在扎尔肯特当过批发商,一周会去ICBC四、五次,把家用商品,主要是床单和针织品带回哈萨克斯坦。他挣的钱取决于他能把多少东西带过海关。通常,他一天能挣相当于15或20美元的钱——这是不错的收入——有时候还能挣到60美元之多。海关执法很松。“对我们来说,你只要和那里工作的人说说,就能把东西带出来,”他说。
More villagers had come out to the road until they completed a circle around us. Tashimkhan changed the subject, then joked with a friend that he was starting to think he would regret talking to me. An older man who had been pacing the street squatted down beside us and began conspicuously sharpening a sickle a few inches from my head. Turar suggested it was time for us to continue down the mountain. We got into the Lada and drove off.
更多的村民来到了路上,直到他们在我们周围围成了一个圈。塔什米汗换了个话题,然后和一个朋友开玩笑说,他开始觉得他会因与我聊天而感到后悔。一个年纪大一些的男子之前一直在街上来回踱步,现在我们旁边蹲了下来,开始惹人注目地在距离我脑袋几英寸的地方磨一把镰刀。图拉尔建议,我们该继续下山了。我们上了拉达汽车,扬长而去。
The great commonplace of our time also happens to be true: The world is more connected than ever before. But if it is more connected, the world is also more administered — its people more coerced and surveilled, more susceptible to the designs of authoritarian leaders and more dependent on the fortunes of mercurial international markets — than at any point in human history. If the first fact has made some parts of the world freer, the second has made the rest of it less so.
我们这个时代最老生常谈的话恰巧也符合事实:这个世界比以往任何时候都更相连。但是,如果说世界更相连了,其实世界也比人类史上的任何时候都更受管理了——世界上的人民受到更多的胁迫和监视,更容易受威权主义领导人摆布的影响,而且更依赖于变幻莫测的国际市场的命运。如果说第一条事实让世界的某些地方变得更自由了,第二条事实则让世界的其他地方更不自由了。
A continuing trial at the local courthouse in Zharkent underscored this inversion, which seemed to me to lie at the heart of the developments at Khorgos. The case concerned Sayragul Sauytbay, a Chinese-born Kazakh woman who had fled Xinjiang and was requesting political asylum in Kazakhstan. Before the crackdown in Xinjiang, ethnic Kazakhs freely crossed the border to visit friends and relatives. But in 2016, as crossings became increasingly fraught, Sauytbay’s husband and two children decided to move permanently to Kazakhstan. Sauytbay, who was working in Xinjiang as a kindergarten director, remained in China with plans to join them; the rest of the family became Kazakh citizens in 2017. For more than a year, they met only in the free-trade zone at the I.C.B.C.
扎尔肯特地方法院一场仍在审理中的案子突显出这种倒置。在我看来,这种倒置正是霍尔果斯发展的核心所在。该案涉及塞拉古·萨于特贝(Sayragul Sauytbay),她是一名在中国出生的哈萨克女子,从新疆逃了出来,正在哈萨克斯坦请求政治庇护。在新疆的镇压开始之前,哈萨克族人能自由地穿越边境,探亲访友。但在2016年,随着穿越边境变得越来越充满危险,萨于特贝的丈夫决定带着两个孩子永久地搬到哈萨克斯坦去。萨于特贝当时是新疆的一名幼儿园园长,她留在了中国,计划以后再与丈夫团圆;她家的其他人2017年成了哈萨克斯坦公民。一年多来,他们只能在ICBC的自贸区见面。
On April 5, 2018, without telling anyone, Sauytbay entered the I.C.B.C. with forged identity papers, then slipped into Kazakhstan by posing as a member of a tour group. A few weeks later, she was arrested and charged with entering the country illegally, and then her story began to emerge. Not long after her family had left China, Sauytbay was assigned to work at one of Xinjiang’s notorious detention camps. In her testimony, she described it as “a prison in the mountains,” with high walls and barbed wire that kept in some 2,500 inmates. She said she was forced by authorities to accept a teaching job there, indoctrinating the inmates in state propaganda, and she was warned that the penalty for revealing any information about the camps was death. The authorities confiscated her passport.
2018年4月5日,在没有告知任何人的情况下,萨于特贝用伪造的身份证件进入了ICBC,然后伪装成旅游团的成员,偷偷进入了哈萨克斯坦。几周后,她被逮捕,并被指控非法入境,后来,人们开始听到她的故事。在她家人离开中国后不久,萨于特贝被分配到新疆最臭名昭著的一个拘留营工作。在她的证词中,她将那里描述为“山里的监狱”,在高墙和带刺铁丝网的里边关押着约2500名被拘押者。她说,当局强迫她接受那里的一份教师工作,向被关押者灌输政府的宣传,当局警告她说,对泄露有关这些拘留营任何信息的惩罚是死刑。当局还没收了她的护照。
萨于特贝和她的儿子。在法庭意外地宣判其获释后,她的法律地位仍然不确定。
萨于特贝和她的儿子。在法庭意外地宣判其获释后,她的法律地位仍然不确定。 Andrea Frazzetta/Institute, for The New York Times
At her trial, Sauytbay provided some of the earliest testimony about life in Xinjiang’s camps. Her case made headlines in Kazakhstan’s national newspapers. She was married to a Kazakh citizen and was herself a “returnee,” a member of the diaspora of ethnic Kazakhs the government has been courting for years. But now prosecutors at Sauytbay’s trial were arguing that she should be deported back to China, where she claimed she would be arrested or even killed for having made public her knowledge of the camps.
在审理她的案子时,萨于特贝提供了一些关于新疆拘留营生活的一些最早证词。她的案子在哈萨克斯坦的全国性报纸上成了头条。她嫁给了一位哈萨克公民,本人是一名“回归者”,政府多年来一直在试图吸引分散在世界各地的哈萨克族人回归祖国,而她正是这些人之一。但如今,萨于特贝案的检方提出,她应被遣返回中国,她声称,在中国,由于她把拘留营的情况公之于众,她会遭到逮捕,甚至会被杀害。
Most people I’d met in Almaty seemed to think she had little chance of receiving asylum, much less Kazakh citizenship. The acquittal rate in criminal trials in Kazakhstan is around 1 percent, and hasn’t changed since the days of the Soviet Union. There was also the B.R.I. to consider. Kazakhstan might decide Chinese investment was more important than any international agreements on refugees. It wouldn’t be the first time a country was so swayed. In 2017, Greece vetoed a European Union statement criticizing China’s human rights record at the United Nations, a decision that critics linked to China’s controlling interest not just in Greece’s largest port but also in its public power grid. In January, China hosted a Silk Road Celebrity China Tour, inviting journalists from six B.R.I. partner countries — Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka — on a highly choreographed tour of a “vocational center” in Kashgar, another famous stop on the ancient Silk Road. According to the state-run Xinhua news agency, the visitors uniformly “praised the development and stability” of Xinjiang. An editor from Bangladesh singled out the region’s contributions “to the nonoccurrence of violence and terrorism.”
我在阿拉木图遇到的大多数人似乎都认为,她不太有可能获得庇护,更不用说哈萨克公民身份了。哈萨克斯坦刑事案件审理中判无罪的比率约为1%,这一比率自苏联时代起就一直没变过。还有“一带一路”倡议需要考虑。哈萨克斯坦可能决定,中国投资比任何关于难民的国际协定都更重要。这并非是一个国家第一次受这种考虑的影响。2017年,希腊否决了一项欧盟在联合国批评中国人权纪录的声明,批评人士将希腊的决定,与中国对希腊最大的港口、以及希腊国家电网所持的控制股份联系起来。今年1月,中国举办了一场丝绸之路名人中国游,邀请来自六个“一带一路”伙伴国家——埃及、土耳其、巴基斯坦、阿富汗、孟加拉国和斯里兰卡——的记者,做了一次经过精心设计的旅游,访问了喀什的一个“职业培训中心”,喀什是古代丝绸之路的另一个著名驿站。根据官方媒体新华社的报道,来访人员一致“赞扬了”新疆的“发展和稳定”。一名来自孟加拉国的编辑专门提到了该地区对“没有出现暴力和恐怖主义”所做的贡献。
My last day in town coincided with what turned out to be the last day of Sauytbay’s trial. About 100 supporters had risen early and driven out from Almaty to the courthouse, which was opposite a park where marble busts of Soviet heroes watched over a playground. When the courtroom opened, the crowd crushed against the glass doors. I made it through with a handful of other reporters thanks to some strategic shoving by a few veteran activists; most of the crowd remained on the courthouse steps.
我在城里的最后一天,恰巧也是萨于特贝案审理的最后一天。约有100名支持者起了个大早,从阿拉木图驱车前往法院,法院与一个公园隔道相望,公园里,苏联英雄的大理石半身像俯瞰着一个儿童游戏场。法院开门时,人群都挤在了玻璃门上。多亏了几名经验丰富活动人士用了一些战略性的推搡,才让我和其他几名记者得以穿过人群进入法庭,大多数人都还留在法院前的台阶上。
As the proceedings began, Sauytbay’s lawyer introduced into evidence a copy of the asylum application that she had just filed. Both the judge and prosecutor interrogated Sauytbay, who from behind a clear protective wall related how, when she was arrested by the Kazakh police, an official told her that she would be sent back to China to die and her children would become orphans.
随着庭审开始进行,萨于特贝的律师向法庭出示了一份她刚刚填好的庇护申请,作为证据的一部分。法官和检方都提问了萨于特贝,她在一个透明的保护墙后面讲述了她是怎样在被哈萨克警方逮捕时,被一名官员告知,她会被送回中国受死,她的孩子会成为孤儿。
Sauytbay freely admitted she’d escaped China illegally. She was willing to serve a prison sentence. She just didn’t want to be sent back. “There is no reason for me to live if I am not with my children,” she told the judge. Her family sat across the room, near an open window through which we could hear the crowd murmuring outside.
萨于特贝坦率地承认她非法逃离了中国。她表示愿意坐牢,只是不想被送回中国。“如果我不能和我的孩子们在一起,就没有活下去的意义了,”她告诉法官。她的家人坐在法庭的另一端,靠近一扇打开的窗户,透过这扇窗,我们能听到外面人群的喃喃声。
天山山脉地区,半游牧的哈萨克人的夏季牧场。
天山山脉地区,半游牧的哈萨克人的夏季牧场。 Andrea Frazzetta/Institute, for The New York Times
The prosecution had previously rejected any kind of a plea deal. So what happened next was that rare thing: a dramatic courtroom reversal. In a closing statement, the prosecutor cited the outpouring of support the case had received across Kazakhstan. She requested that the judge allow Sauytbay to serve out a period of probation at her husband’s house. “I ask you not to apply deportation,” she said. “I ask you to set her free in the courtroom.” Sauytbay’s eyes went wide. Her lawyer, who seemed stunned, agreed. A few moments later, sounds of cheering rang out on the courthouse steps.
检方此前曾拒绝了任何形式的认罪协议。所以接下来发生是那种罕见的事情:法庭的一个突然的彻底转变。在最后陈述中,检方提到了哈萨克斯坦全国上下对该案嫌犯的大量支持。她提请法官做出允许萨于特贝在丈夫家里度过缓刑期的判决。“我请求您不要使用遣返,”她说。“我请求您当庭将她释放。”萨于特贝听得睁大了眼睛。她的律师看上去也惊呆了,但表示同意检方的建议。过了一阵,欢呼的声音在法院前的台阶上响了起来。
“I was surprised the law was kept,” Rysbek Sarsenbay, a prominent opposition activist, told me later. He reasoned that the government must have weighed the consequences of deporting Sauytbay carefully against the risk of alienating China’s leadership. “Even as a dictatorship,” he said, “Kazakhstan must honor its international commitments.”
“看到法律得到了执行,我感到很惊讶,”著名反对派活动人士雷斯贝克·萨尔森拜(Rysbek Sarsenbay)后来告诉我。他推断,政府一定是仔细地权衡了遣返萨于特贝的后果和疏远中国领导层的风险。“即使是一个独裁政权,”他说,“哈萨克斯坦也必须要履行自己的国际承诺。”
Once the judge issued the expected ruling — prosecutors and judges in Kazakhstan rarely disagree — Sauytbay was ushered from the courthouse to the top of the steps, where she embraced her son and thanked President Nazarbayev for his beneficence. A poet took the stage to extemporize a victory verse in Kazakh. The crowd repaired to a restaurant a few miles outside Zharkent, where a spontaneous release party began with the singing of the national anthem. Waiters descended with plates of beshbarmak, a national dish of boiled noodles and horse meat in onion sauce. When Sauytbay arrived, holding her son in her arms, everyone stood up and clapped. She told me she hoped her testimony would “shine a light of hope” for her compatriots in China. “They know there is a country that will always protect them,” she said.
法官宣布了人们意料之中的判决后——哈萨克斯坦检方和法官很少会意见不一致——萨于特贝被人从法庭领到了法院台阶的最上层,在那里,她拥抱了自己的儿子,对纳扎尔巴耶夫总统的慈善表示了感谢。一名诗人登台,即兴用哈萨克语作了一首胜利诗。人群去了扎尔肯特外几英里的一个餐馆,在那里,一个自发形成的庆祝释放的派对开始了,人们首先唱了国歌。服务员端来了“五指面”,这是哈萨克斯坦的一道美食,用洋葱汁马肉配煮面条。当萨于特贝抱着儿子到来时,所有人都站起来为她鼓掌。她对我说,她希望自己的证词能为她在中国的同胞们“带来希望的曙光”。她说,“他们知道有一个国家永远会保护他们。”
The celebration may have been premature. As Sauytbay later told The Globe and Mail of Toronto, within a day of her release, her sister and two friends were arrested in Xinjiang — they have since disappeared into camps — and in October Kazakhstan denied Sauytbay’s asylum claim. For the time being, she is living at home with her family, but her legal status in Kazakhstan is uncertain.
庆祝可能有点儿为时过早。正如萨于特贝后来对多伦多的《环球邮报》(The Globe and Mail)说的那样,就在她被释放的几天里,她的姐妹和两个朋友在新疆被抓了,此后,他们都消失在了拘留营里。去年10月,哈萨克斯坦拒绝了萨于特贝的庇护申请。目前,她和家人住在家里,但她在哈萨克斯坦的法律身份仍属未知。
Even if she manages to avoid deportation, Sauytbay is one of thousands of people with ties to Kazakhstan who have found themselves caught up in Xinjiang’s detention centers. At the release party, I found myself sitting next to a Kazakh woman named Qarlyghash Ziparova, whose nephew, a former Xinjiang official named Askar Azatbek, had disappeared inside the ostensibly neutral free trade zone of the I.C.B.C. Azatbek, who had become a Kazakh citizen a few months earlier, entered the I.C.B.C. in 2017 with a friend, whereupon a group of men drove up in two cars and detained them. The friend was released, but Azatbek was hauled off. They hadn’t even been on the Chinese side, the friend had said. Ziparova tried to complain to authorities in Kazakhstan, but without any luck. The I.C.B.C. told her there was no surveillance video, although she didn’t believe it. She didn’t understand how a Kazakh citizen could be taken away by China like that — without even a trial.
即使她设法避免了被遣返,萨于特贝仍是那些因与哈萨克斯坦有关系而发现自己陷入了新疆拘留中心的数千人中的一个。在庆祝释放的派对上,我发现自己坐在了一位名叫济加尔格哈什·兹帕罗瓦(Qarlyghash Ziparova)的哈萨克女子身边,她的外甥是新疆的一名前官员,名叫阿斯卡尔·阿扎特贝克(Askar Azatbek),他在表面上看起来中立的ICBC自贸区里消失了。阿扎特贝克几个月前刚成为哈萨克斯坦公民,2017年,他与一位朋友进入了ICBC,随后,一群男子乘两辆车向他们开过来,并将他两人拘留。那名朋友已经获释,但阿扎特贝克被带走了。那名朋友说,他们未曾踏上中国那边的领土。兹帕罗瓦试图向哈萨克斯坦的当局投诉,但毫无所获。ICBC告诉她,没有监控视频,但她不相信。她不明白为什么一名哈萨克斯坦公民能被中国就这样带走了——在没有任何审判的情况下。
The ancient Silk Road was equal parts trade route and social network. The routes themselves were in constant flux and administered by no one, and they succeeded through incremental growth and local knowledge in response to changing needs — the exact opposite of the Ozymandian ambitions and sweeping autocratic statecraft that characterize the Belt and Road. For all its potential to create jobs and modernize infrastructures, the project has also created a halo of mass internment camps for the powerless and gray-market economies for the poor. While new official jobs in Khorgos are lifting a lucky few out of poverty, it is far more common to find farmers and herders moonlighting as taxi drivers, security guards or smugglers, part of a precarious network of low-paid freelancers. Such work is susceptible by design to sudden changes in enforcement and depends on a constant influx of disposable workers. It seemed like a high cost for connecting the world.
古老的丝绸之路一半是贸易通道,一半是社交网络。这些路线本身一直在不断变迁,不受任何人管辖,它们的成功在于循序渐进的发展,以及对不断变化的需求的当地知识,这与奥斯曼狄斯式的雄心和横扫一切的专制治国正相反,而雄心和专制则是“一带一路”的特点。尽管它有能够创造工作岗位、将基础设施现代化的潜力,但这个项目也给针对弱势群体的大规模拘留营和面向穷人的灰色市场经济制造了一个光环。尽管霍尔果斯新的正式工作岗位让少数幸运儿脱贫,但那里更容易看到的是农民和牧民兼职做出租车司机、保安或走私者,成为一个无稳定收入的自由职业者网络的一部分。这种工作本身就容易受到执法力度突然变化的影响,靠的是可取代工人的不断涌入。对于将这个世界连接到一起来说,这似乎是个高昂代价。
I hired a taxi to drive me back to Almaty. We took a new highway that opened last year, part of a growing highway system affiliated with the B.R.I. and known as the Western Europe-Western China International Transit Corridor. The highway cuts the travel time in half, from six hours to just over three hours, and driving atop it felt like riding an air-hockey puck. There were no rest stops or gas stations, and the few landmarks I could see stood at an unobtrusive distance. They included an old train station, a pumping house for a Chinese oil pipeline and the alien forms of a half-built wind farm courtesy of SANY Group, the Chinese manufacturing behemoth. As the sun became a narrow red eye on the horizon, a dust storm descended the cliffs to our left and crossed the road into empty veld. There were no cars in sight. It was less a road than the idea of a road.
我雇了一名出租车司机送我回阿拉木图。我们走了一条去年新开通的高速公路,这条路是在“一带一路”倡议下不断发展的高速公路系统的一部分,这个高速公路系统的名称是“西欧—中国西部国际公路运输走廊”(Western Europe-Western China International Transit Corridor)。这条高速公路将旅行的时间缩短了一半,从六个小时减至三个小时多一点,在上面开车感觉就像是坐在一个桌面冰球上。高速路上没有休息区或加油站,我能看到的少数几个地标低调地伫立远远的地方。它们包括一个老火车站、中国石油管道的一个泵站,以及一个形状奇特、建造了一半的风电场,那是中国制造业巨头三一重工的杰作。随着太阳逐渐成为地平线上的一只狭长的红色眼睛,一场沙尘暴从我们左边的悬崖上降临下来,穿过高速公路,进入了空旷的草原。目之所及之处,看不到其他车辆。这不是一条真正的路,更像是一个路的想法。
The driver didn’t know anything about the trial whose outcome I had just seen. He had never heard of Sayragul Sauytbay. He was happy to have such a fine new highway on which to drive his customers back and forth between Khorgos and Almaty. Kazakhstan, we agreed, was a beautiful country. He pointed to some fields he said would be full of cattle in the fall, then opened the sunroof and stuck his hand into the night air.
司机对我刚刚看到结果的那个法庭审理一无所知。他从未听说过塞拉古·萨于特贝。他很高兴能有一条这么好的高速公路,让他能在上面每天在霍尔果斯和阿拉木图之间接送客人。我们都一致同意哈萨克斯坦是个美丽的国家。他指着一些田野说,秋天时那里会满是牛群,然后打开车顶的太阳窗,将手伸到夜晚的空气中。